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SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA TAKES MERITORIOUS CLAIMS
BACK HOME TO THE PLACE THEY BELONG
By
Emma Kline*
I.

INTRODUCTION
In State ex rel. TD Ameritrade, Inc. v. Kaufman, the Supreme Court of

Appeals of West Virginia concluded that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
exceeded its authority when it ruled on the merits of an issue that ultimately was
referred to arbitration.1 The Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that when a trial
court is required to rule on a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the trial court is limited to determining the threshold
issues of: 1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties; and
2) “whether the claims averred by the plaintiff fall within the substantive scope of
that arbitration agreement.”2
II.

BACKGROUND
In Ameritrade, Dan Salamie, appellee, filed a civil action against Bruce

Conrad, an independent financial advisor, and Ameritrade, a New York discount
brokerage firm (together, “appellants”).3 Salamie alleged that he sustained
financial loss when Conrad disregarded specific instructions concerning Salamie’s
investment holdings in four Ameritrade accounts.4 Salamie also asserted that
Ameritrade was vicariously liable for Conrad’s actions, as Conrad was a registered
representative of Ameritrade.5 After Salamie served his first discovery requests on
*
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Ameritrade, Ameritrade filed a motion for protective order and also informed the
trial court that it intended to file a motion to compel arbitration.6 In its motion,
Ameritrade requested that the trial court dismiss Salamie’s litigation claim, or else
stay the litigation pending the outcome of the arbitral decision.7 Before the trial
court decided the issue to compel arbitration, the parties met to attempt settlement
negotiations.8 Salamie said that he would submit to arbitration if Ameritrade would
stipulate that Conrad was “subject to its ‘control’” under federal securities law;
doing so would indicate that Ameritrade was vicariously liable for Conrad’s
actions.9 Ameritrade refused to stipulate.10
Salamie then filed a motion for partial summary judgment.11 Although he
agreed to participate in arbitration, Salamie “requested a ruling from the trial court
as part of the referral on whether Conrad was a ‘controlled person’ under federal
law for purposes of establishing vicarious liability against Ameritrade.”12 The trial
court granted Ameritrade’s motion to compel arbitration, but also approved
Salamie’s motion for partial summary judgment.13 In addition to determining that
Ameritrade was responsible for “monitoring” Salamie’s account and for complying
with certain New York Stock Exchange Rules, the circuit court also held that,
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78(t), Conrad was a “controlled person,” making
Ameritrade vicariously liable for his actions.14 The trial court also ordered the
arbitrator to follow the aforementioned determinations.15 Ameritrade subsequently
filed a rule to show cause to prohibit enforcement of the trial court’s
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determinations that “address[ed] the merits of matters that were referred to
arbitration for resolution.”16
III.

DISCUSSION
In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, the Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia focused on whether “the lower tribunal’s order [was] clearly
erroneous as a matter of law.”17 On appeal, Ameritrade primarily contended that
the trial court was not permitted to address the merits of the underlying
controversy, namely whether Conrad was subject to Ameritrade’s control pursuant
to the Securities Exchange Act.18 Ameritrade believed that the trial court
“exceeded the scope of its legitimate powers” in determining that Conrad was in
fact subject to Ameritrade’s control.

19

Conversely, Salamie maintained that the

trial court’s rulings were “prophylactic,” and that without a determination of
whether Conrad was a “controlled person,” no contract requiring arbitration would
exist.20 Important to note is that the parties were not in dispute regarding the
arbitration provisions in each investment account, nor were they concerned about
the applicability of the FAA; the parties only contested whether the trial court had
the authority to address matters aside from the issue of arbitrability.21 The Supreme
Court ultimately sided with Ameritrade, and explained that “‘in deciding whether
the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not
to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claim.’”22
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The Supreme Court of West Virginia relied on established federal law,
which recognizes that courts are not permitted to review the merits of a grievance,
including whether equity is present in the particular claim, or whether language is
present in the agreement tending to support a party’s claim.23 Ameritrade
recognized, and the Supreme Court agreed, that when the trial court inquired as to
whether Conrad was a “controlled person” it “ventured outside the limitations of
its constrained inquiry and improperly considered and ruled upon the merits of the
case.”24 Contrary to “black letter law” regarding separability, which reserves to
courts the right to evaluate challenges to arbitration agreements and to arbitrators
the right to evaluate the contract as a whole, Salamie believed that the trial court’s
rulings as to Conrad’s “controlled person” status were permissible.25 Though the
court explained that one of the only exceptions to the separability rule exists where
the arbitration agreement was acquired by adhesion; a court may evaluate the
merits of a claim asserting that a party was coerced via fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.26
Although Salamie was able to convince the trial court to rule on whether
Conrad was a “controlled person,” “this foray into matters reserved for arbitral
resolution was clearly improper.”27 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia concluded that where a court is asked to rule on a motion to compel
arbitration pursuant to the FAA, the trial court may only decide the threshold issues
of: 1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and 2) “whether the claims
averred by the plaintiff fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration
agreement.”28 The trial court here expressly exceeded its authority, and violated the
doctrine of separability.29
23

Id. at 297 (citing United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)).
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Id. at 298.
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SIGNIFICANCE
In deciding that the arbitrator in Ameritrade exceeded his authority, the

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia aligned itself with other jurisdictions
that have adhered to the doctrine of separability, which stipulates that courts are to
decide only issues concerning the validity of an arbitration agreement, and the
arbitrability of the claims between two parties. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has established not only its support for the federal policy favoring
arbitration, but also the idea that arbitration is premised in contract. Parties in West
Virginia now have the opportunity to contract for their desired arbitral
proceedings, and courts likely will enforce these contractual arrangements. This
indispensable decision will encourage the West Virginia court system to enforce
arbitration agreements and awards, and ultimately indicates the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia’s movement towards the federal policy in favor of
arbitration.
This decision also implicates the issue of excess judicial authority. By
requiring the arbitrator to disregard the Circuit Court’s holding pertaining to
Conrad’s “controlled person” status, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia established its deference to arbitrators and their authority to decide the
substantive matters at issue.

